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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16669 
t1ARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with aggravated robbery 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended. 
She was convicted of that crime by a jury in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of 
Salt Lake, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. This 
is an appeal from that conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty. The court entered 
judgment and sentenced the aoµellant to serve the statutory 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 1299-1301). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction 
rendered in the court below. 
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On July 18, 1978, four individu2:s were seen getti~· 
into a black and silver Camaro in the vicinity of 169 
Wentworth Avenue (Appellant Griffin's residence) (R. 372.3?\i 
The appellant and three other persons were later seen in the 
Camaro (R. 398). The car stopped in front of the House of 
Sherman Beauty Salon; two men got out of the car and entered 
that establishment (R. 400). 
One of the men wore a moustache, a beard and a blor:: 
Afro wig (R. 733). The other man wore gray pants, a black 
turtleneck sweater and was disguised as a black man (R. 644). 
He wore a black Afro wig and his skin apoeared to be painted 
black (R. 57 5, 58 3, 644) . Both men were armed (R. 574, 576. 
710, 732). 
The appellants ordered the younger women in the 
salon to sit on the floor and everyone was told to take off 
their jewelry (R. 401-405). The men then shoved jewelry 
and purses into a large tote bag and took money from the 
salon's safe (R. 402-406). 
At approximately 2:29 p.m. Detective Labrum s~ 
Marcella Griffin get out of the black and silver Camaro a~ 
walk up the steps leading to the entrance of the House of 
Sherman. He then saw her walk back down those steps 
carrying several purses. She got into the Camaro and drove 
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away (R. 786-793). Within a short time the car was 
stopped by Detectives Welti and Lightfoot (R. 1047). 
The two men fled from the scene of the crime 
in a 1974 beige-colored Volkswagen belonging to one of 
the hairdressers at the salon, Dawn Harmon (R. 1010). 
They drove to the residence of Vivian Gonzales, left 
their disguises there and drove away in a 1969 Green 
Chevrolet (R. 1101). It was later revealed that the car 
was owned by Marcella Griffin (R. 1149). 
After the Camara was stopped, Detective Voyles 
asked Marcella Griff in if he could take her children out 
of her home on Wentworth Avenue, search for the suspects 
and make the area safe. Mrs. Griffin consented (R. 1128, 
1133). It was after 3:00 p.m. when the officers began 
to search the house (R. 1137, 1163). While the officers 
were still in the house, a green Chevrolet parked on the 
road near appellant Griffin's house (R. 1092, 1149). It 
was approximately 4:30 p.m. at that time (R. 1181). Two 
men got out of the car and walked up the driveway. The 
appellants appeared to be heading for the back door; the 
two men tried but could not get in the back door. The men 
left the back area but later appeared to return. An officer 
came out to head off the appellants and it was at that 
time that a duffel bag containing a gun and other evidence 
-3-
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of the crime was found on the back porch. ~h 
- e appellants 
were arrested while trying to pry a window open in the 
front of the house (R, 1183). The green Chevrolet was 
thereafter impounded and an inventory search was conducted 
at the stationhouse (R. 1149). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF 
CONSENT GIVEN TO SEARCH THE GRIFFIN RESIDENCE; 
THE DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN PLAIN VIEW WAS 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A party may waive his or her constitutional ri~t 
to be free from an unreasonable search by consenting to 
the search of a house which would otherwise be im?roper. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). A search 
can be upheld on the basis of consent if the individual 
consents to a search voluntarily with no duress or coercion. 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). This Court 
has likewise held that a search made pursuant to a homeowner'' 
consent is lawful. State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2c 
580, 582 (1965). 
The appellant does not argue that the consent she 
gave to search the Griffin residence was involuntary. She 
admits that valid consent was given to remove the Griffin 
children, search for the suspects and make the area safe. 
-4-
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The appellant does not question the trial court's ruling 
that the duffel bag was lawfully seized on the theory that 
it was in plain view and seized incident to the appellant's 
arrest. However, appellant argues that the officers exceeded 
the scope of the consent because they remained at the Griffin 
residence until the suspects arrived and, therefore, the 
duffel bag was inadmissible evidence. 
The determination as to the reasonableness of a 
search is for the trial judge due to the responsibility of 
the court in controlling the admissibility of evidence and 
his advantaged position in passing on such matters. State v. 
Criscola, 444 P.2d 5l7, 519 (1968). His rulings should be 
"indulged with a presumption of correctness, and should not 
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error." 
Id, Respondent contends that the search of the house was 
reasonable since the objectives of the search, consented to 
by the appellant, were not exceeded. 
When a purpose is included in the request to search, 
as it is in this case, the consent is construed as authorizing 
only that intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish 
the stated purpose: 
Where permission has been given to . 
search for a particular object. the ensuing 
search remains valid as long as its scope 
is consistent with an effort to locate 
that object. 
State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860 (Maine 1974) (emphasis added). 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The only limits prescribed in the consent to searcc 
given by the appellant were ( l) the officers were to look 
for her children, ( 2) they were to search for the susoects, 
and (3) they were to make the area safe--they were to 
look for nothing else but the children and the suspects. 
No time limit was placed on the search' it is difficult 
to estimate just how long it would take to "make the 
area safe." The search was at all times consistent wiili 
the stated objectives. The officers did not use the 
consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory 
search, There is no evidence showing that the officers 
searched drawers, containers, etc., which could not be 
used to conceal a person. 
This does not mean, however, that when consent 
is given to search for a particular object the police may 
never seize something other than the designated items, 
Of course, if the government agents 
acting within the parameters of defendant's 
consent had come upon contraband, fruits or 
instrumentalities of crime, or clear evidence 
of criminal behavior which was lying in 
plain view, they could have seized those 
items , 
United,States v. Dichiarinte, 4115 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971). 
Thus, when an officer is in a position where he has the 
right to be, sees evidence in plain view, and reasonably 
believes the object to be evidence of the crime, seizure 
-6-
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of such evidence is lawful. This Court has acknowledged 
the plain view doctrine. In State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 
cert. denied 434 U.S. 871 (1977), this Court upheld the 
admissibility of a bottle containing heroin which was 
seized at the appellant's home: 
The officers were where they had a 
right to be. Without any intrusion upon 
the defendant, their attention was arrested 
by activities which indicated quite 
unmistakenably that he was committing a 
felony. Therefore, they could arrest him 
without a warrant; and they could take 
anything in the immediate area which was 
so involved in the criminal conduct that 
it would serve as evidence in proof of the 
crime. Though the bottle from which the 
narcotic had been taken was placed on the 
dresser in the adjoining bedroom, it was 
in the immediate vicinity; and it was in 
plain view in that no search was required 
to discover it. In fact the charge that 
there was a search" in this case is for 
that reason a distortion of language, 
because there was really no "search" 
involved. 
Id. at 1127, 1128 (emphasis added). 
Respondent submits that the officers were in a 
position where they had a right to be since the scope of 
the consent to search had not been exceeded and that the 
bag found at the residence containing evidence of the 
crime was admissible evidence found in plain view during 
the attempt to arrest the appellants. The trial court 
agreed that the officers had a right to be in the house 
at the time the appellants arrived and that the duffel 
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bag was lawfully seized . 
. the officer was there with her 
(Marcella Griffin's) permission, to look 
for the subjects, suspects, and went out the 
back door, didn't see this big sport suit case 
(duffel bag), and later when he did go it was 
there. Probably the inference I would draw 
it was taken with them when they got out of' 
the green automobile and came to the house 
and dropped it when they couldn't get in the 
back door. Therefore, part of the instrumentali-
ties of the crime and the fruits of the crime 
and incident to arrest, they could ~ick that® 
and possess it and use it in evidence against. 
the subjects--suspects in this case. (R.1147) 
In this case the officers had the right to be ~ 
the Griffin residence. The Appellant had given them 
permission to enter the house, obtain her children for 
safekeeping, search for the suspects and make the area 
safe. The officers had not exceeded the scope of the 
consent by looking for anything other than the children 
and the suspects; nor did the officers remain there for an 
unreasonable amount of time. The testimony at trial indicate: 
that the officers arrived at the Griffin residence after 
3:00 p.m. (R. 1137), and began the search. The male suspects 
arrived at approximately 4: 30 p.m. (R. 1181). The record 
does not indicate just what efforts were taken to ensure 
the safety of the children or to search for the suspects. 
Furthermore, the record does not indicate what procedures 
(or their extensiveness) were taken to make the area safe. 
It is, therefore, difficult to tell from the record whether 
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the time spent searching the appellant's home was unreasonable. 
The record does show that an officer was searching the back 
area of the house, including the porch where the duffel 
bag was later found, just 15-20 minutes before the 
appellants arrived at the residence (R. 1165). Seizure of 
the duffel bag cannot be said to exceed the scope of the 
consent search. The duffel bag was seen in plain view and 
under circumstances giving rise to the reasonable belief 
that the evidence had been left there by the two men 
when they tried to enter the back door. The trial court, 
therefore, did not err in ruling that the evidence was 
admissible. The evidence was not the fruit of an 
unreasonable search since it was seen in plain view by an 
officer who had the right, by the appellant's consent, to 
be in a position to see the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The determination as to the reasonableness of a 
search is for the determination of the trial judge and his 
rulings should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears 
that he was in error. The trial judge in this case properly 
ruled that the officers had a right to be in the Griffin 
residence--they had not exceeded the scope of the consent 
search. Furthermore the evidence seized at that time was 
found in plain view and therefore was admissable evidence. 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent, therefore, urges this Court to affirm 
the judgment of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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